So many words and not a single one mentioning the Russo-Georgian War of 080808. Do you think the sole reason for it was that Mikheil Saakashvili is a tall brunet and Putin is a clothes moth?
That's an important chapter in the region's history, but it's a different story. My focus is why Astana is rewriting its energy strategy now, not why Russia and Georgia went to war in 2008.
Georgia did not “went to war” in 2008. Russia did. It didn’t do it because Mishiko called the guy Lilliputin but because Astana was buying Georgian sea ports, electric grid and railways. Astana is not “rewriting“ anything. Tokayev simply doing what they always needed to do but could not until Ukraine destroyed the Russian military and Azerbaijan build their own.
I don't think Kazakhstan will abandon Russia. If anything, Astana has repeatedly reaffirmed its multi-vector foreign policy.
What has changed is the balance within that strategy. Russia has become a less reliable partner due to the war, repeated disruptions to energy transit, sanctions, and its growing difficulty delivering major infrastructure projects. As a result, Kazakhstan is diversifying its partnerships, not replacing one dependency with another. In my view, this is less a pivot away from Russia than a renewed effort to avoid depending too heavily on any single power.
To me — and I could be wrong — it seems like a high-risk strategy that Kazakhstan is pursuing. When you live next door to a giant — Canada and Mexico next to the U.S., Kazakhstan next to Russia, and so on — not having a close relationship with that giant long-term rarely works out well.
Of course, geopolitical rivals like to encourage that kind of move to create trouble for their adversaries (as we are doing with Kazakhstan), but long-term, the countries used that way (pawns) end up in a worse place. Not always, but mostly.
Given how important Kazakhstan is to Russia's national security, and given how tiny its population is (20 million), the odds are not in Kazakhstan's favor. Or so it would seem to me. If I were Kazakhstan I wouldn't have pursued this high-risk low-reward strategy, but I am an American, so this is not my call.
I'm not advocating for it. Just describing reality as I see it.
Thank you! I think that's a very fair point. Kazakhstan itself still describes its foreign policy as multi-vector; the idea of maintaining constructive relations with all major powers rather than aligning exclusively with any one of them.
What has changed, in my view, is not the doctrine but the weighting. Since 2022, Moscow has become a far less reliable partner. The repeated disruptions to the CPC pipeline, the growing security risks associated with Russian export infrastructure, and Russia's increasing difficulty delivering major infrastructure projects (such as delays abroad and the cancellation of the thermal power plant agreement in Kazakhstan) have all reduced confidence in Russia's long-term reliability.
I don't think Astana is trying to leave Russia. As you mentioned, geography simply doesn't allow that. Rather, it is trying to reduce its dependence on a single partner by strengthening ties with China, Turkey, the South Caucasus, Europe, and others. In many ways, that is still multi-vector foreign policy, just with a different balance than a decade ago.
So many words and not a single one mentioning the Russo-Georgian War of 080808. Do you think the sole reason for it was that Mikheil Saakashvili is a tall brunet and Putin is a clothes moth?
That's an important chapter in the region's history, but it's a different story. My focus is why Astana is rewriting its energy strategy now, not why Russia and Georgia went to war in 2008.
Georgia did not “went to war” in 2008. Russia did. It didn’t do it because Mishiko called the guy Lilliputin but because Astana was buying Georgian sea ports, electric grid and railways. Astana is not “rewriting“ anything. Tokayev simply doing what they always needed to do but could not until Ukraine destroyed the Russian military and Azerbaijan build their own.
If we're going to argue over the phrasing of "went to war," we're drifting away from the main point...
Words matter. What you call “multi-vector policy“ I call “held hostage“. The implications are totally different.
Russia’s losses are China’s gains. Expect Central Asia to fully pivot to the East and abandon Russia within 5 years
I don't think Kazakhstan will abandon Russia. If anything, Astana has repeatedly reaffirmed its multi-vector foreign policy.
What has changed is the balance within that strategy. Russia has become a less reliable partner due to the war, repeated disruptions to energy transit, sanctions, and its growing difficulty delivering major infrastructure projects. As a result, Kazakhstan is diversifying its partnerships, not replacing one dependency with another. In my view, this is less a pivot away from Russia than a renewed effort to avoid depending too heavily on any single power.
Great thoughtful article.
To me — and I could be wrong — it seems like a high-risk strategy that Kazakhstan is pursuing. When you live next door to a giant — Canada and Mexico next to the U.S., Kazakhstan next to Russia, and so on — not having a close relationship with that giant long-term rarely works out well.
Of course, geopolitical rivals like to encourage that kind of move to create trouble for their adversaries (as we are doing with Kazakhstan), but long-term, the countries used that way (pawns) end up in a worse place. Not always, but mostly.
Given how important Kazakhstan is to Russia's national security, and given how tiny its population is (20 million), the odds are not in Kazakhstan's favor. Or so it would seem to me. If I were Kazakhstan I wouldn't have pursued this high-risk low-reward strategy, but I am an American, so this is not my call.
I'm not advocating for it. Just describing reality as I see it.
Thank you! I think that's a very fair point. Kazakhstan itself still describes its foreign policy as multi-vector; the idea of maintaining constructive relations with all major powers rather than aligning exclusively with any one of them.
What has changed, in my view, is not the doctrine but the weighting. Since 2022, Moscow has become a far less reliable partner. The repeated disruptions to the CPC pipeline, the growing security risks associated with Russian export infrastructure, and Russia's increasing difficulty delivering major infrastructure projects (such as delays abroad and the cancellation of the thermal power plant agreement in Kazakhstan) have all reduced confidence in Russia's long-term reliability.
I don't think Astana is trying to leave Russia. As you mentioned, geography simply doesn't allow that. Rather, it is trying to reduce its dependence on a single partner by strengthening ties with China, Turkey, the South Caucasus, Europe, and others. In many ways, that is still multi-vector foreign policy, just with a different balance than a decade ago.