Let me preempt my comment by saying I am Greek. However I hope, I can keep a realistic viewpoint.
Turkey’s economy is by no means rosy. Their currency has been in free fall for some time. Their economic policy is unorthodox. This in itself is a weakness, not a competitive edge that is not really mentioned in the article (except a simple reference to the inflation level).
I am not going to refer extensively to the level of their democracy and the questionable coup, although it has extended the political life of the president.
NATO and being indispensable…. At the same time allowing the unlawful flow of immigrants (let me not use a more strong wording) even if the country gets economic support from EU for exactly the opposite reason. Threatening Greece (another NATO member) with war…
The US congress has seen this playbook in the past, thus has taken Turkey out of the F35 programme.
More importantly being friendly with many doesn’t mean that you are true friends. As in real life, acquaintances and opportunistic friendships end when situations change.
It’s a volatile period across the globe, so we shall see what happens.
Geography is constant (exception being any changes due to natural phenomena… earthquakes etc.), but importance of geography is variable.
We see all the plans to sidestep SoH.
We have seen the lifespan of Russian pipeline to Germany.
Capabilities … drone production is a big one, but Ukraine is counterbalancing isn’t it? Also the preference for sovereign solutions within EU is to be noted. Agreed it’s time consuming.
With regards to the economic weakness…. Your substack’s name is helpful… Atlas Shrugged is a book that comes in mind…
I really appreciate your additions, especially coming from someone much closer to the subject. You raise some very valid points. Turkey’s economic situation is a story of its own, and I certainly share your view there.
Geography can create leverage, but it can’t compensate for economic weakness indefinitely. It will be interesting to see how that balance develops...
I agree that Turkey’s position within NATO is full of contradictions. Its disputes with Greece and its use of migration as leverage against Europe hardly resemble the behaviour of a conventional ally. But that is also part of the broader argument: Turkey’s importance increasingly comes not from being an easy ally, but from controlling geography and capabilities that NATO and Europe cannot easily replace.
Thanks for the thoughtful comment. I agree that Turkey’s economic weakness is an important counterweight to the argument. The lira, inflation, and years of unconventional monetary policy clearly constrain how far Erdoğan can push this strategy.
My argument, though, is not that Turkey is becoming economically stronger and more that its geography is becoming strategically more valuable as the surrounding order fragments. In fact, that tension is part of what makes the story interesting: Turkey is gaining geopolitical leverage while its domestic economic foundations remain fragile.
I wouldn’t describe Russia, the US, or Europe as true friends of Turkey either. That was partly my point: Turkey can deepen its relationship with Russia while simultaneously closing the Straits to Russian warships. These relationships are transactional, and Turkey seems quite comfortable cooperating where interests overlap and pushing back where they don’t.
Whether Turkey can turn that geopolitical leverage into durable power without fixing its economic weaknesses is probably the bigger question.
Thank you for this essay! I would love to hear your thoughts about the recent status and the future perspectives of the Regional Four (or R4 Group) in connection with your analysis.
Excellent analysis. One question came to mind while reading it. You explain Turkey's behaviour primarily through geopolitical positioning and strategic autonomy, but do you think Ankara's own threat perception deserves a more central place in the analysis? Over the past year, senior Turkish officials have increasingly suggested that, after Iran, Israel could eventually become Turkey's next strategic challenge. If that perception is genuinely shaping defence planning, then projects such as Steel Dome, missile expansion, and even the broader military buildup may not only reflect neo-Ottoman ambition, but also a classic security dilemma. I'd be interested in your view on how significant this factor has become.
Thank you, I appreciate it! And that’s a good point, and an important one.
I think the two increasingly reinforce each other. Turkey’s pursuit of strategic autonomy is about creating room to maneuver, but a changing threat perception. Particularly toward Israel, makes that autonomy more valuable. Steel Dome and the broader military buildup can therefore be read both as power projection and insurance. The security dilemma may be accelerating the strategy rather than replacing it. There’s so much happening around Turkey right now that this angle could probably be an article of its own.
Thank you again for your thoughtful response. I actually explored this argument in a recent article, where I tried to connect the Steel Dome project, Hakan Fidan's statements, and Turkey's evolving threat perception into a single strategic framework. Since you mentioned this angle could be an article of its own, I thought you might find it interesting. If you happen to have time to read it, I'd genuinely value your feedback.
Sitting between worlds is the right frame, and Montreux is a stronger example than the piece makes it. Turkey did not inherit that convention. On 10 April 1936 Ankara wrote to the Lausanne signatories asking them to reopen the Straits regime, on the argument that Europe no longer looked as it had in 1923. The conference met at Montreux on 22 June and signed on 20 July, and Turkey came away with sovereignty restored, the international commission abolished and the right to refortify. It was done by note and conference, with Italy boycotting the table over the Abyssinia sanctions and the Rhineland freshly remilitarised, because every power there needed Turkey more than it needed the restriction. The playbook is therefore republican as much as Ottoman, and Atatürk's foreign ministry ran it with a fraction of the Empire's weight.
The domestic half deserves saying too. The army removed or forced out an elected government in 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997, and it has not done so under Erdoğan and the AK Party. The mechanism was dismantled deliberately: the harmonisation package of July 2003 made the National Security Council an advisory body and opened its secretariat to civilians, and when the attempt came on 15 July 2016 it broke in the street. The heritage work is the same instinct turned inward. TİKA has restored more than eighty Ottoman-era mosques, bridges, baths and clock towers across the Balkans, which is a state spending money on the understanding that a people does not escape its own history and is steadier for knowing it.
Which of those is Ankara actually leaning on now, the treaty or the continuity?
People are too obsessed with religion and ideology. When you set it aside you realize very little changed after 1453. Roughly the same territory, the same enemies, mostly the same economy. Byzantine and Ottoman is the same Empire.
Energy is at the heart of it. Turkey sits at the crossroads of an energy nexus. It is the ultimate middleman, which makes Turkey one of the world's greatest energy brokers. In a way, this far surpasses China's energy strategy.
Let me preempt my comment by saying I am Greek. However I hope, I can keep a realistic viewpoint.
Turkey’s economy is by no means rosy. Their currency has been in free fall for some time. Their economic policy is unorthodox. This in itself is a weakness, not a competitive edge that is not really mentioned in the article (except a simple reference to the inflation level).
I am not going to refer extensively to the level of their democracy and the questionable coup, although it has extended the political life of the president.
NATO and being indispensable…. At the same time allowing the unlawful flow of immigrants (let me not use a more strong wording) even if the country gets economic support from EU for exactly the opposite reason. Threatening Greece (another NATO member) with war…
The US congress has seen this playbook in the past, thus has taken Turkey out of the F35 programme.
More importantly being friendly with many doesn’t mean that you are true friends. As in real life, acquaintances and opportunistic friendships end when situations change.
It’s a volatile period across the globe, so we shall see what happens.
I appreciate the discussion.
Geography is constant (exception being any changes due to natural phenomena… earthquakes etc.), but importance of geography is variable.
We see all the plans to sidestep SoH.
We have seen the lifespan of Russian pipeline to Germany.
Capabilities … drone production is a big one, but Ukraine is counterbalancing isn’t it? Also the preference for sovereign solutions within EU is to be noted. Agreed it’s time consuming.
With regards to the economic weakness…. Your substack’s name is helpful… Atlas Shrugged is a book that comes in mind…
I really appreciate your additions, especially coming from someone much closer to the subject. You raise some very valid points. Turkey’s economic situation is a story of its own, and I certainly share your view there.
Geography can create leverage, but it can’t compensate for economic weakness indefinitely. It will be interesting to see how that balance develops...
And I forgot to mention one other point:
I agree that Turkey’s position within NATO is full of contradictions. Its disputes with Greece and its use of migration as leverage against Europe hardly resemble the behaviour of a conventional ally. But that is also part of the broader argument: Turkey’s importance increasingly comes not from being an easy ally, but from controlling geography and capabilities that NATO and Europe cannot easily replace.
Thanks for the thoughtful comment. I agree that Turkey’s economic weakness is an important counterweight to the argument. The lira, inflation, and years of unconventional monetary policy clearly constrain how far Erdoğan can push this strategy.
My argument, though, is not that Turkey is becoming economically stronger and more that its geography is becoming strategically more valuable as the surrounding order fragments. In fact, that tension is part of what makes the story interesting: Turkey is gaining geopolitical leverage while its domestic economic foundations remain fragile.
I wouldn’t describe Russia, the US, or Europe as true friends of Turkey either. That was partly my point: Turkey can deepen its relationship with Russia while simultaneously closing the Straits to Russian warships. These relationships are transactional, and Turkey seems quite comfortable cooperating where interests overlap and pushing back where they don’t.
Whether Turkey can turn that geopolitical leverage into durable power without fixing its economic weaknesses is probably the bigger question.
Thank you for this essay! I would love to hear your thoughts about the recent status and the future perspectives of the Regional Four (or R4 Group) in connection with your analysis.
Good suggestion, will definitely look into it!
Excellent analysis. One question came to mind while reading it. You explain Turkey's behaviour primarily through geopolitical positioning and strategic autonomy, but do you think Ankara's own threat perception deserves a more central place in the analysis? Over the past year, senior Turkish officials have increasingly suggested that, after Iran, Israel could eventually become Turkey's next strategic challenge. If that perception is genuinely shaping defence planning, then projects such as Steel Dome, missile expansion, and even the broader military buildup may not only reflect neo-Ottoman ambition, but also a classic security dilemma. I'd be interested in your view on how significant this factor has become.
Thank you, I appreciate it! And that’s a good point, and an important one.
I think the two increasingly reinforce each other. Turkey’s pursuit of strategic autonomy is about creating room to maneuver, but a changing threat perception. Particularly toward Israel, makes that autonomy more valuable. Steel Dome and the broader military buildup can therefore be read both as power projection and insurance. The security dilemma may be accelerating the strategy rather than replacing it. There’s so much happening around Turkey right now that this angle could probably be an article of its own.
Thank you again for your thoughtful response. I actually explored this argument in a recent article, where I tried to connect the Steel Dome project, Hakan Fidan's statements, and Turkey's evolving threat perception into a single strategic framework. Since you mentioned this angle could be an article of its own, I thought you might find it interesting. If you happen to have time to read it, I'd genuinely value your feedback.
https://tonyanthonylondon.substack.com/p/the-invisible-fear-turkeys-rearmament
Sitting between worlds is the right frame, and Montreux is a stronger example than the piece makes it. Turkey did not inherit that convention. On 10 April 1936 Ankara wrote to the Lausanne signatories asking them to reopen the Straits regime, on the argument that Europe no longer looked as it had in 1923. The conference met at Montreux on 22 June and signed on 20 July, and Turkey came away with sovereignty restored, the international commission abolished and the right to refortify. It was done by note and conference, with Italy boycotting the table over the Abyssinia sanctions and the Rhineland freshly remilitarised, because every power there needed Turkey more than it needed the restriction. The playbook is therefore republican as much as Ottoman, and Atatürk's foreign ministry ran it with a fraction of the Empire's weight.
The domestic half deserves saying too. The army removed or forced out an elected government in 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997, and it has not done so under Erdoğan and the AK Party. The mechanism was dismantled deliberately: the harmonisation package of July 2003 made the National Security Council an advisory body and opened its secretariat to civilians, and when the attempt came on 15 July 2016 it broke in the street. The heritage work is the same instinct turned inward. TİKA has restored more than eighty Ottoman-era mosques, bridges, baths and clock towers across the Balkans, which is a state spending money on the understanding that a people does not escape its own history and is steadier for knowing it.
Which of those is Ankara actually leaning on now, the treaty or the continuity?
— Nazem
People are too obsessed with religion and ideology. When you set it aside you realize very little changed after 1453. Roughly the same territory, the same enemies, mostly the same economy. Byzantine and Ottoman is the same Empire.
Energy is at the heart of it. Turkey sits at the crossroads of an energy nexus. It is the ultimate middleman, which makes Turkey one of the world's greatest energy brokers. In a way, this far surpasses China's energy strategy.